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SHIFTING THE BURDEN: GENUINE DISPUTES AND EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION STANDARDS OF PROOF 
Barrett S. Moore 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“The purpose of Title VII ‘is to promote hiring on the basis of job qual-
ifications, rather than on the basis of race [, gender, national origin, reli-
gion,] or color.’”1 Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy penned this 
quote in Ricci v. DeStefano, a 2009 decision granting summary judgment in 
a reverse discrimination case against the city of New Haven, Connecticut.2 
New Haven had refused to hire white firefighters based on a qualification 
test because too few minority firefighters would be hired as a result.3 The 
City feared the racial disparity of the test’s results, so it disregarded the test 
and hired a more diverse group.4 That good-intentioned decision brought 
race into the hiring process, ending in liability at the United States Supreme 
Court. 
Ricci is one of many cases proving that America’s relationship with 
civil rights legislation has come full circle. What began as a congressional 
attempt to battle workplace discrimination—an insidious and evasive foe—
has become a specter for all thinking employers. Title VII initially targeted 
discrimination against minorities and the disadvantaged. Today that same 
law balances employment decisions when conscientious employers overre-
act, as New Haven did in Ricci.5  
Our society’s struggle to find the boundary between discrimination and 
merit-based hiring falls largely beyond the scope of this article. But that 
tension, and the tension between the judiciary and Congress on how to best 
accomplish Title VII’s purposes, deserves analysis. The meaning of Title 
VII has spiraled since Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Courts 
  
  Barrett Moore is an attorney at Blair & Stroud in Batesville, Arkansas. He graduated 
from Hendrix College in 2006 with a degree in English and Politics and the UALR William 
H. Bowen School of Law in 2009 with high honors. 
 1. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 582 (2009) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424, 434 (1971)).  This quote is altered to include Title VII’s other protected clas-
ses. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 2. 557 U.S. at 585–86. 
 3. Id. at 562. 
 4. Id. at 587–88. 
 5. See generally id.   
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interpreted and re-interpreted the Act; Congress reacted in 1972, 1978, and 
1991; and recent cases demonstrate the judiciary’s increased skepticism and 
confusion about proving discrimination.6  
The heart of this confusion surrounds the way discrimination plaintiffs 
prove their case. Although it does not apply at trial, an obscure three-part 
standard created in 1973 decides the majority of Title VII complaints.7 The 
McDonnell Douglas standard involves three shifting burdens designed to 
balance the inherent difficulties of proving employment discrimination.8  
The circuits are divided on McDonnell Douglas and its applicability at 
summary judgment. This division is due, in part, to recent amendments to 
Title VII about mixed-motive discriminations. A mixed-motive case has 
proof that illegal discrimination, as well as other legitimate reasons, moti-
vated an employment decision.9 The Sixth Circuit recently abandoned 
McDonnell Douglas for all mixed-motive discrimination cases.10 The Fifth 
Circuit has modified McDonnell Douglas, adding a mixed-motive exception 
to the usual shifting burdens.11 Some circuits exempt direct evidence from 
the McDonnell Douglas standard.12 The Eleventh Circuit holds fast to 
McDonnell Douglas without exception.13 Many circuits, however, have not 
addressed the split,14 with some specifically refusing to do so.15  
The Eighth Circuit charted its own course, applying McDonnell Doug-
las regardless of any mixed-motive proof.16 The Eighth Circuit mitigates this 
standard with a unique definition for direct evidence of discrimination. Di-
rect evidence, which can be strong circumstantial evidence, need not satisfy 
McDonnell Douglas in this Circuit.17 Since adopting that approach, the 
  
 6. See infra Parts I & II. 
 7. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973). 
 8. Id. at 802–04. 
 9. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 396 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 10. Id. at 400. After White, Sixth Circuit plaintiffs must genuinely dispute whether they 
suffered an adverse employment action driven in part by race as a motivating factor. Id. at 
402–04. 
 11. Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 2005); Rachid v. Jack in 
the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 12. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 
2005); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004); Fogg v. Gonza-
les, 492 F.3d 447, 451 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  
 13. See Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004).  
 14. The Second and Seventh Circuits are silent on this circuit split. See White, 533 F.3d 
at 399. 
 15. See e.g., Houser v. Carpenter Tech. Corp., 216 F. App’x 263, 265 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Furaus v. Citadel Comm. Corp., 168 F. App’x 257, 260 (10th Cir. 2006); Rodriguez v. Sears 
Roebuck De P.R., Inc., 432 F.3d 379, 380–81 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 16. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004).  
 17. Id.  
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Eighth Circuit, en banc, issued a split decision in Torgerson v. City of Roch-
ester, with the deciding vote concurring and inviting a revision to the rule.18  
Torgerson, another firefighter discrimination case, is the defining 
Eighth Circuit precedent on McDonnell Douglas, direct evidence, and the 
proof necessary to survive summary judgment.19 That case highlights the 
problems with the Eighth Circuit’s approach and the difference between 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and discrimination summary judg-
ments.20 The tension between these standards, and the larger struggle within 
the circuits about McDonnell Douglas, showcases the uncertain road to re-
covery for discrimination plaintiffs. 
This article proceeds in four parts. The first part tracks the tense devel-
opment of Title VII and the McDonnell Douglas standard. The second 
summarizes the circuit splits about McDonnell Douglas and its effect on 
discrimination proof. Next, the article details Torgerson v. City of Roches-
ter. Finally, the fourth part synthesizes the above and argues for a closer 
analysis of discrimination summary judgments. The law is in disarray, with 
disputed discrimination facts resolved improperly at summary judgment.  
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AND THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS 
STANDARD 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 codified the long-running civil 
rights battle in the workplace, giving disadvantaged employees a remedy in 
federal court.21  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or re-
fuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]22 
Since the Act’s passage, the number of employees seeking Title VII’s 
protection has steadily increased to an annual high of almost 100,000 charg-
es of discrimination filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
  
 18. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. 
Ct. 513 (2011).  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Before the Act, Civil Rights enactments were relegated to the Executive Branch.  
President Roosevelt issued an anti-employment discrimination executive order for govern-
ment workers. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 25, 1941). President Kennedy 
took the Order further in 1961, requiring affirmative action to implement the executive or-
der’s mandates. Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 8, 1961).  
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).  
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sion (EEOC) in 2011.23 Filing a charge with the EEOC is the first step under 
Title VII.24 Of those charges filed, only 15,141 took the next step and filed 
suit in federal court.25 If the 2011 statistics hold true, then no more than 
2.4% of those employment lawsuits will make it to trial.26 The ones that do 
and the many that do not will generate only 214 appeals nationwide.27 
The statistics say much about Title VII and its modern necessity. Al-
most 100,000 Americans believed in 2011 that they were fired, not hired, or 
not promoted because of illegal discrimination.28 A little more than 15%, 
however, took the next step after receiving a right to sue letter and filed suit.  
The ones that did file found little favor in the United States District Courts.29 
A. Early Amendments and McDonnell Douglas 
Congress and the courts have sparred over Title VII for decades, soon 
after the 1964 Act. Despite the sparring, the McDonnell Douglas standard 
evolved unaltered by congressional amendment. The judiciary tends to limit 
the reach of Title VII.30 Congress reacts by overruling Supreme Court deci-
sions and by expanding Title VII.31 All the while the McDonnell Douglas 
standard persists. 
The Civil Rights Act was first amended by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972.32 Those amendments expanded Title VII’s coverage 
  
 23. Charge Statistics, FY 1997 through FY 2011, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).  
The charge-filing process is the first step to seeking any redress under Title VII. 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 
 25. 2011 Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts, 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 129 (2012), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness2011.pdf. 
 26. Id. at 151.  
 27. Id. at 65.  
 28. Charge Statistics, supra note 23. That number of people filed a charge of discrimina-
tion with the EEOC. A charge, the first step under Title VII, is a complaint under oath stating 
that unlawful discrimination was the reason for an adverse employment decision.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(b); Hall v. St. John Missionary Baptist Church, No. 4:08-CV-645-WRW, 2010 
WL 703163, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 23, 2010).       
 29. Christopher J. Emden, Note, Subverting Rule 56? McDonnell Douglas, White v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., and the Mess of Summary Judgment in Mixed-Motive Cases, 1 WM. 
& MARY BUS. L. REV. 139, 150 & n.81 (2010). It is difficult, of course, to look behind the 
statistics and state with certainty that all of the cases not making it to trial were due to sum-
mary judgments in favor of the employer. These dismissals no doubt include an unknown 
number of settlements and perhaps even a few favorable summary judgments towards em-
ployees. 
 30. See infra Part II.C. 
 31. See infra Part II.C.  
 32. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-e17.  
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to public employers and increased the EEOC’s enforcement powers.33 These 
first amendments were encouraged by Congress’s specific concerns about 
gender discrimination.34 
Soon after these amendments, a unanimous Supreme Court handed 
down the seminal McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green decision.35 In 
1973, Title VII was tried to the bench and the burden of proof was uncer-
tain.36 Under the second step, the Supreme Court clarified in McDonnell 
Douglas that the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving his prima facie 
case.37 “The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legit-
imate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.”38 On remand, 
the McDonnell Douglas plaintiff “must, as the Court of Appeals recognized, 
be afforded a fair opportunity to show that petitioner’s stated reason for re-
spondent’s rejection was in fact pretext.”39 Pretext was the final step. The 
trial judge would later apply these three shifting burdens sitting as the finder 
of fact.40 McDonnell Douglas immediately became the heart of discrimina-
tion trials. 
The Supreme Court overstepped Title VII’s boundaries a few years lat-
er. The divided decision of General Electric Company v. Gilbert spurned an 
amendment to Title VII.41 Gilbert held that an employer’s exclusion of 
pregnancy-related coverage in an employee health plan did not violate Title 
VII.42 Specifically, the Court found no showing that “the exclusion of preg-
nancy benefits is a mere ‘pretex[t] designed to effect an invidious discrimi-
nation against the members of one sex or the other.’”43 Congress disagreed 
in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, endorsing the dissenting Justices’ 
opinions and overruling Gilbert.44 After two rounds of amendments there 
  
 33. Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1346–47 (2012).  
 34. Id. at 1347 n.213; see also Megan E. Wooster, Note, Sexual Harassment Law—The 
Jury Is Wrong as a Matter of Law, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 215, 222 (2010). 
 35. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  
 36. Landsgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 252–53 (1994) (applying prior law). 
 37. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  
 38. Id. at 802–03.  
 39. Id. at 804. 
 40. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 390 F. Supp. 501, 503 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff’d, 
528 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 41. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 § 1, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)), as recognized in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 
85, 89 (1983).  
 42. Id. at 133–35.  
 43. Id. at 136 (alteration in original).  
 44. Mary Wiseman, Note, Employment Discrimination—Title VII’s Limited Preemptive 
Effect Allows State Laws Mandating Pregnancy Leave and Reinstatement, California Federal 
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was little doubt that Title VII proscribed discrimination against women. But 
McDonnell Douglas was unaltered. 
B. Burdine Sharpens McDonnell Douglas 
The Supreme Court reexamined McDonnell Douglas’s shifting burdens 
and their ultimate utility in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine.45 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had vacated an em-
ployer’s verdict because the employer failed to prove the second burden: 
“the existence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment 
action.”46 The Supreme Court reversed, noting that “[t]he ultimate burden of 
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.”47 
According to Burdine, McDonnell Douglas’s shifting burdens never 
shifted the ultimate burden of proof from the plaintiff.48 Instead, the shifting 
burdens ameliorated the proof problems inherent in every discrimination 
case.49 
Usually, assessing the burden of production helps the judge determine 
whether the litigants have created an issue of fact to be decided by the ju-
ry. In a Title VII case, the allocation of burdens and the creation of a pre-
sumption by the establishment of a prima facie case is intended progres-
sively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of inten-
tional discrimination.50 
The first burden, the prima facie case, “eliminates the most common 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection.”51 If the fact-finder 
believes the prima facie case and the employer offers no legitimate nondis-
criminatory explanation, then the plaintiff wins.52 
Of course, the employer may rebut the prima facie case by presenting a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason at the second step. “[T]he defendant 
must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the 
reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection.”53 The reason for this second burden is 
“to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will 
  
Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987), 9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 
669, 674–75 (1987). 
 45. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
 46. Id. at 252.  
 47. Id. at 253.  
 48. Id. at 258.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 255 n.8. 
 51. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.  
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 255.  
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have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.”54 The Supreme 
Court made clear that the plaintiff could show pretext “by persuading the 
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated” the employer’s 
decision or by showing that the employer’s stated reason was false.55 Pretext 
remained the essential inquiry. 
The Burdine Court considered the proof problems facing discrimina-
tion plaintiffs and stood behind the burden-shifting framework.56 The liberal 
discovery allowed by the Federal Rules and the plaintiff’s access to the 
EEOC’s investigation records afforded the employee sufficient information 
“to prove that a proffered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext.”57 
McDonnell Douglas’s shifting burdens remained the standard for all Title 
VII bench trials. 
C. Price Waterhouse and The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
The next disagreement between the Supreme Court and Congress revo-
lutionized Title VII. In the 1989 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins decision, the 
accounting firm Price Waterhouse denied Hopkins partnership because of 
her gender and because she had an abrasive personality.58 Evaluations chas-
tising Hopkins for being “‘macho’” and “‘overcompensate[ing] for being a 
woman’” littered her employment file.59 The official guidance to Hopkins 
about increasing her partnership prospects was to “‘walk more femininely, 
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry.’”60 The district court and the court of appeals af-
firmed Price Waterhouse’s liability, disagreeing only on the burden of proof 
for the employer’s affirmative defense.61  
Under the affirmative defense, an employer must prove that it would 
have made the same employment decision regardless of any discriminatory 
animus.62 Although the court of appeals in Price Waterhouse applied a clear 
and convincing burden of proof, the Supreme Court reduced the burden of 
  
 54. Id. at 255–56. 
 55. Id. at 256. 
 56. Id. at 258.  
 57. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258.  
 58. 490 U.S. 228, 234–37 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166 (1991) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006)), as recog-
nized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).  
 59. Id. at 235. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 237. 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
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proof to a preponderance of the evidence standard.63 The Court also reversed 
and remanded Price Waterhouse’s liability.64 
Within two years, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to ab-
rogate Price Waterhouse.65 The 1991 Amendment overhauled the method 
for proving discrimination and added a right to a jury trial.66 Discrimination 
was now illegal if it “was a motivating factor for any employment practice, 
even though other factors also motivated the practice.”67 If illegal discrimi-
nation played any role in an employment decision, then the employer was 
liable under the new amendments.68 The affirmative defense no longer ab-
solved the employer of liability, but only limited the employee’s remedies.69 
Liability expanded to include compensatory and punitive damages.70 The 
facts about discrimination were now a matter for the jury.71 
D. Hicks and Reeves  
McDonnell Douglas survived the 1991 Amendments to some degree.72 
In 1993, the Supreme Court wrestled with McDonnell Douglas and its ap-
plication to jury trials in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks.73 
[T]he question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensi-
tive and difficult. . . . There will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to 
the employer’s mental processes.  But none of that means that trial courts 
or reviewing courts should treat discrimination differently from other ul-
timate questions of fact.  Nor should they make their inquiry even more 
difficult by applying legal rules which were devised to govern “the basic 
allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof,” in deciding this 
ultimate question.74 
The Supreme Court went on to reinstate the employer’s verdict, holding that 
the plaintiff must do more than follow McDonnell Douglas and disprove the 
  
 63. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 254–55. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Jan W. Sturner, Comment, Preemployment Medical Exams Under the ADA: 
Conditional Job Offers and the Application of the Mixed-Motive Framework, 50 ARK. L. 
REV. 449, 467 n.51 (1997). 
 66. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102(4)(c), Pub. L. No. 102-166 (1991) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 68. Id. 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c). 
 72. See infra Part II. 
 73. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
 74. Id. at 524 (citation omitted) (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. 
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)). 
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employer’s explanation for its decision; the plaintiff must show that discrim-
ination was a real motivation for the decision.75 
In the 2000 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. decision, the 
Supreme Court revisited Hicks, again holding that a plaintiff must do more 
than disprove an employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to pre-
vail.76 Once the employer articulated its reason, “‘the McDonnell Douglas 
framework—with its presumptions and burdens’—disappeared, and the sole 
remaining issue was ‘discrimination vel non.’”77 The Reeves plaintiff made 
its prima facie case and offered sufficient evidence to reject the employer’s 
reason, so the court of appeals erred in granting the employer judgment as a 
matter of law on appeal.78 The court of appeals had improperly failed to 
draw all factual inferences in the plaintiff’s favor “substitut[ing] its judg-
ment concerning the weight of the evidence for the jury’s.”79  
E. Desert Palace 
The 1991 Amendments added a new category of liability: decisions 
motivated in part by discrimination.80 The courts have struggled with the 
type of proof required to prove mixed-motive discrimination. “Since the 
passage of the 1991 Act, the Courts of Appeals have divided over whether a 
plaintiff must prove by direct evidence that an impermissible consideration 
was a ‘motivating factor’ in an adverse employment action.”81 In addition to 
the standard of proof on mixed motive, the vitality of Price Waterhouse 
after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was also unclear. 
In 2003, the Supreme Court passed on the Price Waterhouse issue and 
clarified the mixed motive standard of proof in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Cos-
ta.82 The Court held that circumstantial evidence of discrimination was 
enough to receive a mixed-motive jury instruction.83 “Congress explicitly 
defined the term ‘demonstrates’ in the 1991 Act . . . as to ‘mee[t] the bur-
dens of production and persuasion.’”84 
Circumstantial evidence of discrimination is more than sufficient under 
Title VII after Desert Palace.85 
  
 75. Id. at 508–09, 518–25. 
 76. 530 U.S. 133, 146–47 (2000). 
 77. Id. at 142–43 (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 (1993) 
and U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983)). 
 78. Id. at 149–54. 
 79. Id. at 153. 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
 81. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003). 
 82. Id. at 94. 
 83. Id. at 101–02. 
 84. Id. at 99 (alteration in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m)). 
 85. Id. at 99–100. 
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We have often acknowledged the utility of circumstantial evidence in 
discrimination cases.  For instance, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products, Inc., we recognized that evidence that a defendant’s explana-
tion for an employment practice is “unworthy of credence” is “one form 
of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimina-
tion.”86 
If an employee puts forward sufficient evidence—direct or circumstantial—
that unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor in an employment de-
cision, then the employee gets a mixed-motive jury instruction.87 
This shift in the law was significant. Employers were now liable under 
Title VII if discrimination played a part in a decision. According to one 
study, juries instructed on mixed motive are statistically more likely to find 
discrimination under this new theory.88 The plain language of the instruction 
shows why: “‘If you find that the plaintiff’s sex was a motivating factor in 
the defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your ver-
dict, even if you find that the defendant’s conduct was also motivated by a 
lawful reason.’”89 The circuit courts later split over the affect of Desert Pal-
ace on McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment.90 That split is discussed 
in more detail in Part II. 
Since the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress has not reacted to Su-
preme Court interpretations of Title VII. The Act has been amended to in-
clude a new protected class.91 Congress is considering other amendments,92 
including amending the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to counter a 
non-Title VII decision.93 It appears, however, that the problems with Title 
VII at summary judgment will not be resolved by Congress. 
  
 86. Id. at 99–100 (citation omitted). 
 87. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101–02. 
 88. David Sherwyn & Michael Heisel, The Gross Beast of Burden of Proof: Experi-
mental Evidence on How the Burden of Proof Influences Employment Discrimination Case 
Outcomes, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901, 934–35 (2010). 
 89. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 96 (quoting Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 
858 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 90. See infra Part II.  
 91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (2006). 
 92. Congress has also proposed a sexual orientation and gender identity protected classi-
fication. Recent Proposed Legislation, Employment Discrimination—Congress Considers Bill 
to Prohibit Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Iden-
tity—Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009), 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 1803 (2010). 
 93. Although many different areas of the law incorporate the reasoning of Title VII, the 
Supreme Court declared in 2009 that age discrimination does not follow the 1991 amend-
ments to the Civil Rights Act. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173–74 (2009).  
To succeed at trial, an age discrimination plaintiff must prove that age was the “but for” 
cause of his adverse employment action. Id. at 176. That spurned the Protecting Older Work-
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III. THE CIRCUITS SPLIT:  REEVES, DESERT PALACE, AND MCDONNELL 
DOUGLAS 
In the wake of Reeves and Desert Palace, the circuits have split over 
the continued role of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifts. The once im-
portant tool for focusing discrimination proof was in doubt. When Congress 
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it was no longer clear if the fact-finder, 
now a jury, should be instructed on McDonnell Douglas. It was also unclear 
if the McDonnell Douglas standard for summary judgments survived Desert 
Palace. The circuits remain divided on these questions. 
A. McDonnell Douglas and the Jury 
Before the Reeves decision, courts were already skeptical about in-
structing a jury on McDonnell Douglas.94 The Eighth Circuit said it best in a 
non-Title VII case before the 1991 amendments:   
McDonnell-Douglas was not a jury case and its ritual is not well suited 
as a detailed instruction to the jury. “[T]o read its technical aspects to the 
jury . . . will add little to the juror’s understanding of the case and, even 
worse, may lead jurors to abandon their own judgment and to seize upon 
poorly understood legalisms to decide the ultimate question of discrimi-
nation.”95 
Courts now universally accept that McDonnell Douglas is not a matter 
for the jury.96 This is especially true in light of Reeves, which leaves no de-
bate that the ultimate issue is discrimination, not shifting burdens.97 
The circuits disagree, however, on whether juries should also be in-
structed on the last part of McDonnell Douglas, the pretext stage, as one 
method of proving discrimination. The Third Circuit mandates a pretext jury 
instruction because that is the final step at summary judgment.98 “It is diffi-
  
ers from Discrimination Act, which did not leave the House of Representatives. H.R. 3721, 
111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr3721. 
 94. See, e.g., Grebin v. Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 49-5, 779 F.2d 18 (8th Cir. 
1985), abrogated by Foster v. Univ. of Ark., 938 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 95. Id. at 20–21 (quoting Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979) (altera-
tions in original) (discussing McDonnell Douglas jury instructions in an age discrimination, 
non-Title VII case). 
 96. E.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 739–40 (6th Cir. 2005); Gehring v. 
Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994). A plain reading of Hicks and Reeves supports 
this conclusion. The ultimate issue is whether discrimination motivated an employment deci-
sion, not whether the plaintiff or the defendant satisfied one of the McDonnell Douglas bur-
dens. 
 97. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142–43 (2000). 
 98. Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 280 (3rd Cir. 1998). 
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cult to understand what end is served by reversing the grant of summary 
judgment for the employer on the ground that the jury is entitled to infer 
discrimination from pretext . . . if the jurors are never informed that they 
may do so.”99 The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have adopted this line of reason-
ing, reading the Reeves case to require a pretext jury instruction.100  
The First, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits disagree, re-
quiring no pretext jury instruction.101 Seventh Circuit Judge Easterbrook 
summarized this approach pre-Reeves:   
[A] judge need not deliver instructions describing all valid legal princi-
ples. Especially not when the principle in question describes a permissi-
ble, but not an obligatory, inference. Many an inference is permissible.  
Rather than describing each, the judge may and usually should leave the 
subject to the argument of counsel.102 
Instead of instructing the jury on pretext, lawyers in these circuits argue the 
facts about pretext to the jury. As for Reeves, it “did not address in any way 
the necessity of a particular jury instruction,” so these courts found it inap-
plicable.103 
The shift from bench trials to jury trials created this confusion. Before 
the 1991 Amendments, McDonnell Douglas was the order of proof at tri-
al.104 Now it disappears, as Hicks and Reeves held, into the ultimate question 
of discrimination before the jury.105 The jurisdictions that instruct juries on 
pretext do so in addition to instructions on discrimination in general. In the 
other jurisdictions, any error from a pretext jury instruction is harmless if 
that instruction accurately describes the law.106 All of the circuits agree, 
however, that juries should not walk through McDonnell Douglas’s shifting 
burdens.107 
  
 99. Id. (citation omitted). The Second Circuit also reached this same conclusion before 
the 2000 Reeves decision.  Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 382 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 100. Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1241 (10th Cir. 2002); 
Ratliff v. City of Gainesville, Tex., 256 F.3d 355, 360–61 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 101. See Browning v. United States, 567 F.3d 1038, 1041–42 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Conroy v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 375 F.3d 1228, 1232–33 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2004); 
Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786, 789–90 (8th Cir. 2001); Fite v. Digital 
Equip. Corp., 232 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit opinion pre-dates the Reeves 
decision. Gehring, 43 F.3d at 343. 
 102. Gehring, 43 F.3d at 343 (citing to United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1391 
(7th Cir. 1987)). 
 103. Conroy, 375 F.3d at 1233. 
 104. See, e.g., Grebin v. Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 49-5, 779 F.2d 18 (8th Cir. 
1985), abrogated by Foster v. Univ. of Ark., 938 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 105. See supra Part I.E. 
 106. E.g., Moore, 249 F.3d at 790 n.9. 
 107. E.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 739–40 (6th Cir. 2005); Gehring, 
43 F.3d at 343. 
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B. McDonnell Douglas at Summary Judgment 
The creation of a new category of liability in the 1991 Act—mixed-
motive discrimination—and Desert Palace’s expansion of proof for this 
category called McDonnell Douglas into question. If circumstantial evi-
dence can prove that discrimination was a motivating factor in a discrimina-
tion case, even amidst legitimate motivations, then why bother with 
McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment? The 1991 Amendments made 
mixed-motive discrimination illegal.108 Desert Palace took the law further, 
clarifying that both direct and circumstantial evidence was sufficient to 
prove mixed-motive discrimination.109 McDonnell Douglas survived these 
developments, but the circuits diverged on the degree of its survival.110 Most 
circuits have responded to Desert Palace with exceptions or modifications 
to McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment.111 Only one circuit holds fast 
to the shifting burdens despite any evidence of multiple motivations.112  
1. Single Motive Versus Mixed Motive 
In White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., the Sixth Circuit abandoned the 
McDonnell Douglas framework for mixed-motive cases while retaining it 
for single-motive cases.113 White, an African-American sales representative, 
had stellar performance reviews at Baxter Healthcare Corporation (“Bax-
ter”).114 Despite White’s superior qualifications, Baxter hired a white candi-
date for a managerial position.115 During his interview for that position, 
White discussed the lack of diversity at Baxter.116 White’s next performance 
review was not entirely positive, and White had evidence that his evaluating 
supervisor had previously made several racially discriminatory state-
ments.117 
The Sixth Circuit analyzed White’s failure to promote claim under the 
traditional McDonnell Douglas standard.118 “White has presented his failure 
to promote claim as a single-motive discrimination claim brought pursuant 
  
 108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 109. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02 (2003). 
 110. See supra Part I.E. 
 111. See supra Part II.A. 
 112. Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 280 (3rd Cir. 1998). 
 113. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied 129 S. 
Ct. 2380 (2009). 
 114. Id. at 385–87. 
 115. Id. at 387. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 385–89. 
 118. Id. at 391. 
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only to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).”119 This statute forbids employment deci-
sions made “because of” an individual’s protected class.120 The Sixth Circuit 
found that White’s superior qualifications and the diversity discussion in the 
interview had created a genuine dispute on pretext.121 White did not offer 
evidence of multiple reasons for Baxter’s failure to promote decision, so the 
Sixth Circuit applied the usual McDonnell Douglas standard here.122  
White argued that his unfavorable performance review, however, was 
motivated in part by his supervisor’s discriminatory animus.123 According to 
the Sixth Circuit, that meant White’s second claim fell under 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(m).124 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added that provision to over-
rule Price Waterhouse and expand liability under Title VII.125 That section 
states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining party demon-
strates that [a protected classification] was a motivating factor for any em-
ployment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”126 
After surveying the various circuit approaches, the Sixth Circuit abandoned 
McDonnell Douglas for mixed-motive summary judgments.127 It relied 
heavily on the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) and Desert Pal-
ace.128 “In order to reach a jury [on mixed motive], the plaintiff is not re-
quired to eliminate or rebut all the possible legitimate motivations of the 
defendant as long as the plaintiff can demonstrate that [unlawful discrimina-
tion] factored into the defendant’s decision . . . .”129 
This new standard meant that few mixed-motive cases in the Sixth Cir-
cuit would be decided at summary judgment.130 White’s claim was no ex-
ception. The evidence that his supervisor harbored a racial animus and that 
his supervisor misapplied the evaluation criteria to White created a genuine 
dispute for trial.131  
  
 119. White, 533 F.3d. at 390 n.4. 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 121. White, 533 F.3d at 394. 
 122. Id. at 395. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (codified as amended in 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a), as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
 127. White, 533 F.3d at 400. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 401. 
 130. Id. at 402. 
 131. Id. at 406. 
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Judge Tymkovich of the Tenth Circuit criticized the single versus 
mixed motive distinction in a recent article.132 “Nothing in the text of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, indicates that Congress intended courts 
to maintain this [single motive versus mixed motive] dichotomy.”133 Other 
scholars are more enthusiastic about the Sixth Circuit’s approach.134 
2. Modified McDonnell Douglas: Pretext or Mixed Motive 
The Fifth Circuit handled the Amendments and Desert Palace by mod-
ifying the third stage of McDonnell Douglas to include a mixed-motive in-
quiry.135 Instead of creating a genuine dispute at the third stage about the 
employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason as a pretext for discrimina-
tion, plaintiffs may also show “that the defendant’s reason, while true, is 
only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another ‘motivating factor’ is the 
plaintiff’s protected characteristic.”136 This approach preserves the benefits 
of McDonnell Douglas while modifying the doctrine to address the holding 
of Desert Palace. 
Some scholarship criticizes the Fifth Circuit approach for unnecessarily 
retaining the prima facie step and the employer’s legitimate nondiscrimina-
tory reason. “The first two steps of McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting 
become duplicative [in mixed-motive cases].”137 That same scholarship also 
found that almost all of the decisions citing the Fifth Circuit’s Rachid case 
affirmed summary judgments, suggesting that the modified approach did not 
widen the courthouse door for discrimination plaintiffs.138 
3. McDonnell Douglas or Evidence of Discrimination 
Three circuits give plaintiffs the choice between McDonnell Douglas 
and mixed motive at summary judgment. In the Fourth Circuit, a plaintiff 
can survive summary judgment by producing direct or indirect evidence of 
discrimination, even amidst other legitimate motives, or by following 
  
 132. The Honorable Timothy J. Tymkovich, The Problem with Pretext, 85 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 503, 522 (2008). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See, e.g., Sarah Keates, Note, Surviving Summary Judgment in Mixed Motive Cas-
es—White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 785, 797–98 (2009). 
 135. Rachid v. Jack In The Box Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004) (applying that standard 
to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). 
 136. Id. at 312 (quoting Rishel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865 
(M.D.N.C. 2003)). 
 137. Thomas F. Kondro, Comment, Mixed Motives and Motivating Factors: Choosing a 
Realistic Summary Judgment Framework for § 2000e-2(m) of Title VII, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1439, 1448 (2010). 
 138. Id. at 1449. 
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McDonnell Douglas.139 The D.C. Circuit seems to agree, allowing plaintiffs 
to prove a mixed-motive case through either McDonnell Douglas or through 
direct or indirect evidence of discrimination.140 The Ninth Circuit similarly 
allows plaintiffs two avenues when responding to summary judgment: direct 
and indirect evidence or the McDonnell Douglas standard.141 
Judge Tymkovich agreed with these circuits142 and stated that “[s]uch 
an approach implicitly eliminates the relevancy of the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis in Title VII cases because most (if not all) plaintiffs would prefer to 
pursue their case under the less onerous and more statutorily anchored 
mixed motive framework.”143 In these circuits, plaintiffs choose their sum-
mary judgment standards. 
4. Traditional McDonnell Douglas 
The Eleventh Circuit refuses to modify McDonnell Douglas. “[T]he 
fact that the Court did not even mention McDonnell Douglas in Desert Pal-
ace makes us even more reluctant to believe that Desert Palace should be 
understood to overrule that seminal precedent.”144 The Eleventh Circuit went 
on to apply the traditional McDonnell Douglas standard on summary judg-
ment.145 Many other circuits have not addressed the split,146 with some spe-
cifically refusing to do so.147 
The Eighth Circuit appears to follow the traditional McDonnell Doug-
las camp.148 On closer inspection, however, the Eighth Circuit incorporates 
the mixed-motive issue in its summary judgment framework. “[T]he issue is 
whether the plaintiff has sufficient evidence that unlawful discrimination 
was a motivating factor . . . .”149 To answer this question, plaintiffs can pro-
duce both direct and indirect evidence of discrimination.150 
  
 139. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 140. Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 451 & n.* (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 141. Id.; McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 142. Tymkovich, supra note 132, at 529. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004), overruled on other 
grounds, Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006). 
 145. Id. at 725–26. 
 146. The Second and Seventh Circuits are silent on this circuit split. See White v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 399 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 147. Houser v. Carpenter Tech. Corp., 216 F. App’x 263, 265 (3d Cir. 2007); Furaus v. 
Citadel Commc’ns Corp., 168 F. App’x 257, 260 (10th Cir. 2006); Rodriguez v. Sears Roe-
buck De P.R., Inc., 432 F.3d 379, 380–81 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 148. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 149. Id. (emphasis added). 
 150. Id. at 736. 
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Direct evidence in the Eighth Circuit is evidence, direct or circumstan-
tial, linking the challenged employment decision to an illegal motivation.151 
Without evidence that “clearly points” to an illegal motive, plaintiffs are left 
with the McDonnell Douglas standard.152 The Eighth Circuit recently revis-
ited that holding en banc.153 
IV. TORGERSON V. CITY OF ROCHESTER, THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S TAKE ON 
TITLE VII 
David Torgerson, a Native American, and Jami Mundell, a white fe-
male, applied with the City of Rochester, Minnesota for open firefighter 
positions.154 Torgerson and Mundell passed the City’s three-phase qualifica-
tion process, only to fail at the final interview for the same open position.155 
The qualification phase ranked forty-eight candidates based on physical 
fitness, aptitude, and a panel interview with members of the City’s firefight-
er commission.156 Torgerson and Mundell were not among the highest 
ranked persons for the open positions, but the City certified them for final 
interviews due to a federal Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Re-
sponse (SAFER) grant.157 The grant funded three of the available positions 
and required the City to fill those positions with women and minorities “‘to 
the extent possible.’”158 To comply with the grant, the City’s Human Re-
sources Director recommended interviewing Torgerson and Mundell due to 
the “minimal differences in the total points between candidates.”159 
The City needed seven new firefighters.160 It considered groups of three 
candidates for each position based on the qualification scores.161 The City 
interviewed the three highest-ranked candidates for the first vacancy.162 Af-
ter filling that vacancy, the two remaining candidates were eligible for the 
second vacancy, as was the fourth highest-ranked candidate, and so on, until 
all seven vacancies were filled.163 The City added Torgerson and Mundell to 
  
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. de-
nied 132 S. Ct. 513 (2011). 
 154. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, No. 07-1968, 2008 WL 5244761 (D. Minn. Dec. 15, 
2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 605 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2010), aff’d on reh’g, 643 F.3d 
1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 513 (2011). 
 155. Id. at *1–3. 
 156. Id. at *1–2. 
 157. Id. at *3. 
 158. Id. (referring to the requirements set forth by the SAFER grant). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Torgerson, 2008 WL 5244761, at *3. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. 
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the seventh vacancy’s interview, alongside the two remaining candidates 
from prior interviews and the ninth-highest ranked candidate.164 
The Fire Chief conducted the final interviews.  He did not consider 
Torgerson and Mundell using the same criteria as the three regular candi-
dates.165 Instead, he looked for “some quality or attribute [the person 
brought] that didn’t come out in the test that [they could] say, wow, this is a 
strong candidate regardless of their test scores.”166 The three other white 
male candidates were interviewed only for a “red flag. Something that 
show[ed] up. It could [have been] a gut-level feeling . . . that might [have 
given] us a clue that there [was] a concern about a candidate.”167 After the 
interviews, the Chief made a combined recommendation against Torgerson 
and Mundell “because they did not ‘demonstrate[ ] themselves to be equally 
or better qualified’” than the other candidates.168 The City’s firefighter 
Commission adopted these recommendations, choosing not to hire either 
Torgerson or Mundell.169 
A member of the City Council eventually investigated the hirings be-
cause the Commission recommended a convicted felon for one of the fire-
fighter positions.170 The investigator questioned two members of the City’s 
firefighter commission and the Fire Chief.171 The first Commissioner did not 
know about the SAFER grant’s minority and female hiring restrictions and 
told the investigator that “‘had [the Commissioner] known, [he] would have 
recommended that the City not take the grant.’”172 This Commissioner was 
not present for the final vote, and he did not conduct either Torgerson’s or 
Mundell’s panel interviews.173 The second Commissioner defended the 
Commission’s decision to the investigator, explaining that “‘[the convicted 
felon] was a big guy and [ ] he’d make a good firefighter.’”174 This Commis-
sioner was involved in the final vote.175 When the investigator mentioned to 
the Fire Chief that the SAFER grant risked potential discrimination lawsuits, 
the Fire Chief responded that he found Torgerson and Mundell “unfit” dur-
ing their interviews.176 The Fire Chief later explained in a deposition that 
Torgerson and Mundell were qualified because they made the qualified can-
  
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Torgerson, 2008 WL 5244761, at *3. 
 167. Id. (first alteration in original). 
 168. Id. at *4 (alteration in original). 
 169. Id. at *5. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at *7. 
 172. Torgerson, 2008 WL 5244761, at *7. 
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didate list.177 Qualified and fitness meant different things, however, to the 
Fire Chief.178 Torgerson and Mundell sued the City for national origin and 
gender discrimination.179 
A. The District Court Grants Summary Judgment 
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted 
the City summary judgment on Torgerson and Mundell’s claims under Title 
VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act.180 The district court found that 
the first Commissioner’s statement that the City should not have taken the 
SAFER grant and the second Commissioner’s statement that the felon was 
qualified because he was a big guy were not direct evidence of discrimina-
tion.181 Direct evidence can be plain, like a decision-maker stating, we are 
not hiring you because you are a woman.182 A decision-maker might state in 
an exit interview, for example, that the terminated employee needs to dress 
more femininely if she wants a promotion.183 The harder cases have discrim-
inatory statements by a decision-maker that are only circumstantially linked 
to the employment decision or only evidence that the decision-maker holds a 
discriminatory bias in general.184 The distinction between direct and indirect 
evidence makes a difference in the Eighth Circuit: direct evidence requires a 
trial while indirect evidence must first pass through McDonnell Douglas’s 
shifting burdens.185 
On the first Commissioner’s statement, the district court found no di-
rect evidence. “Testimony that [the first Commissioner] recommended 
against taking a grant that ‘stipulated’ the City hire women and minorities, 
regardless of relative qualifications, is not evidence of discriminatory ani-
mus. At most, it is evidence of concern that the Commissioners have the 
discretion to hire the best-qualified firefighters.”186 The district court also 
found no connection between this statement and Torgerson and Mundell. 
  
 177. Id. 
 178. Torgerson, 2008 WL 5244761, at *11. 
 179. Id. at *1. 
 180. Id. at *13.  The district court also dismissed Torgerson’s § 1981 national origin 
discrimination claim.  Id. at *5–6. 
 181. Id. at *7–8. 
 182. E.g., Gunn v. Langston, No. 3:10-CV-35-DPM, 2011 WL 3667759, at *3–4 (E.D. 
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 183. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234–37 (1989), superseded by 
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (codified as amended in 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a), as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
 184. See, e.g., Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 934 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 185. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 186. Torgerson, 2008 WL 5244761, at *7. 
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The first Commissioner did not participate in either plaintiff’s panel inter-
view, and that Commissioner was not present when the Commission certi-
fied the final list of firefighters.187 
The Court found the second Commissioner’s statement similarly lack-
ing. That statement was a defense of the Commission’s decision to recom-
mend a convicted felon, was “devoid of reference to women,” and was, 
therefore, not evidence of discrimination.188 The second Commissioner vot-
ed to certify the final list of firefighters, but he also “moved and voted to 
expand the certification to include the protected group candidates” for the 
final interviews.189 Weighing this evidence, the district court found no direct 
evidence of discrimination. 
The district court then applied the three-part McDonnell Douglas bur-
den-shifting test to Torgerson and Mundell’s indirect evidence of discrimi-
nation. The first step requires a plaintiff to prove a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. The elements of this requirement are that (1) the plaintiff is a 
member of a protected class who (2) met the employer’s (or potential em-
ployer’s) legitimate job expectations when the plaintiff (3) suffered an ad-
verse employment action, and (4) similarly situated persons outside the pro-
tected class did not suffer the same fate.190 The district court assumed that 
Torgerson and Mundell met this burden.191 
At the second step, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a le-
gitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.192 The City’s two nondis-
criminatory reasons for failing to hire the plaintiffs were that Torgerson and 
Mundell ranked lower on the qualification scores and that the Fire Chief’s 
interview confirmed their low rankings.193 
Once an employer articulates its reasons for the employment decision, 
the plaintiff resumes its burden, which now requires a showing of a genuine 
dispute about the employer’s reasons as a pretext for discrimination.194 Ac-
cording to the district court in Torgerson, “Plaintiffs must both discredit the 
City’s reason for not hiring them and show that circumstances permit draw-
ing the reasonable inference that the real reasons they were not hired were 
that Mundell is female and Torgerson’s national origin is Native Ameri-
can.”195 The ultimate question becomes, is the proof of pretext—and ulti-
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 188. Id. at *8. 
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mately discrimination—stronger than the employer’s reason for its deci-
sion?196 
The district court found no genuine disputes on pretext.  The panel in-
terviews, although subjective, sufficiently “established scoring criteria” and 
“predetermined questions” to guard against problems in the interviews.197 
Although the Fire Chief interviewed Torgerson and Mundell using different 
criteria than the other candidates, the court found that Torgerson and 
Mundell were not similarly situated to the other applicants with higher qual-
ification scores.198 The Fire Chief’s distinction between the plaintiffs’ quali-
fications and fitness was also insufficient to show pretext “[g]iven the con-
text of [his] statement and the absence of evidence suggesting that [the Fire 
Chief] found Plaintiffs unfit based on their protected group status.”199 All of 
this proof fell against the City’s qualification scores, entitling the City to 
summary judgment.200 
B. An Eighth Circuit Panel Reverses 
A divided three-judge panel reversed the district court. Circuit Judge 
Lavenski Smith authored the majority opinion, with Circuit Judge Diana 
Murphy in agreement.201 Circuit Judge William Benton dissented.202 The 
majority opinion recited a now overruled line of cases, which state “that 
‘summary judgment should be used sparingly in the context of employment 
discrimination and/or retaliation cases where direct evidence of intent is 
often difficult or impossible to obtain.’”203 The majority also recited the rule 
that “summary judgment should not be granted in ‘close’ cases” because 
that might invade the jury’s duty to find facts.204 
The majority found that Torgerson and Mundell showed a prima facie 
case because the truly objective portion of the qualification phase tied 
Torgerson with one of the hired candidates and ahead of another and placed 
Mundell within three-tenths of a point of one hired candidate.205 The majori-
ty excised the panel interview scores from the qualification rankings.  At the 
pretext stage, the majority “conclud[ed] that deciding the efficacy of Roch-
ester’s steps to ensure nondiscriminatory evaluation [during the panel inter-
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views] is, on the facts in this record, better reserved for the jury.”206 The 
subjectivity of the panel interview and the Fire Chief interview also favored 
a jury trial.207 Instead of adopting the Fire Chief’s explanation for his “fit-
ness” versus “qualified” distinction, the majority reserved that job to the 
jury.208 The Court did not reach a direct evidence analysis.209 
The dissent disagreed, finding insufficient evidence to genuinely dis-
pute the City’s score-based reason as a pretext for discrimination.210 The fact 
that Torgerson and Mundell scored lower than the hired candidates meant 
that they were not as qualified for the positions as the hired candidates.211 
The subjectivity of the interviews, the Fire Chief’s fitness statement, the Fire 
Chief’s different criteria for Torgerson and Mundell, and both Commission-
ers’ challenged statements should not have overcome the objectivity of the 
City’s scores.212 
C. The Eighth Circuit En Banc Vacates and Affirms 
The Eighth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and vacated the panel 
opinion.213 Five judges, with Circuit Judge Benton writing, voted to affirm 
the district court.214 Circuit Judge Steven Colloton concurred in the opinion 
of the Court.215 Five judges, with Circuit Judge Smith writing, dissented in 
part.216 
The entirety of the en banc Court agreed that there is no discrimination 
exception to the summary judgment standard.217 “There is no ‘discrimination 
case exception’ to the application of summary judgment, which is a useful 
pretrial tool to determine whether any case, including one alleging discrimi-
nation, merits a trial.”218 The Torgerson court overruled a host of opinions 
with that old language.219 The supposed discrimination exception cautioned 
against granting summary judgment because proof of discriminatory moti-
vation is difficult to find. Although this standard seems consistent with the 
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purpose of McDonnell Douglas and the difficult proof in discrimination 
cases, it is no longer the law in the Eighth Circuit.220 According to the ma-
jority, the Eighth Circuit does “not ‘treat discrimination differently from 
other ultimate questions of fact.’”221 The majority reasserted the district 
court’s analysis with added citations.222 The two Commissioners’ statements 
were not direct evidence of discrimination, and the Fire Chief’s fitness 
comment was not sufficient proof of pretext.223 Torgerson and Mundell met 
their prima facie cases, but they could not show pretext.224 The majority 
refigured the qualification scores without the panel interviews, concluding 
that Torgerson and Mundell were not objectively ranked anywhere near the 
other candidates.225 According to the majority, Torgerson and Mundell had 
“[a]t best . . . ‘relatively similar qualifications’ to some hired candidates.”226 
1. The Deciding Concurrence 
Judge Colloton cast the deciding vote in Torgerson.  He concurred “on 
the understanding that the [majority] opinion merely takes as a given the 
circuit precedent of Griffith v. City of Des Moines.”227 Colloton then made 
clear that Desert Palace may justify reconsidering Griffith en banc, stating 
that “[w]hether the en banc court should adhere to Griffith and its inquiry 
into whether a plaintiff has presented ‘direct evidence’ of discrimination in 
Title VII summary-judgment cases after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa is not presented for decision.”228 After consider-
ing the record as a whole, Judge Colloton found insufficient evidence from 
which a jury could find unlawful discrimination.229 
2. The Dissent 
The dissent agreed that there is no discrimination case exception to 
summary judgment, although that language has persisted for a generation.230 
“That said, we should never forget that, ‘[a]t the summary judgment stage, 
the court should not weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or 
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attempt to determine the truth of the matter.’”231 True to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56, after drawing all inferences in the nonmoving party’s 
favor, summary judgment is inappropriate if there are genuine disputes of 
material fact.232 
According to the dissent, the McDonnell Douglas shifting burdens of 
proof “are designed to assure that the ‘plaintiff [has] his day in court despite 
the unavailability of direct evidence.’”233 Three pieces of evidence struck the 
dissenters as genuine disputes on pretext. First, the first Commissioner’s 
statements about never accepting the SAFER grant are susceptible to multi-
ple meanings.234 “Delving into [the first Commissioner’s] thought processes 
and explaining away his comment so as to avoid any inference of discrimi-
natory animus is inappropriate and in direct conflict with the summary 
judgment standard.”235 That Commissioner, moreover, voted to certify the 
final qualifications list, signed two-thirds of the recommendation forms, and 
appeared very involved in the hiring process.236 
The second Commissioner’s statement about hiring a felon because he 
was a “big guy” was also evidence of pretext.237 That comment “on its face, 
references gender,” so a jury could believe that comment is discriminatory 
and related to the hiring process.238 Finally, the Fire Chief’s statement that 
Torgerson and Mundell were unfit “during a discussion of the SAFER grant 
and protected-group candidates,” even though the Chief admits Torgerson 
and Mundell were qualified, could establish a discriminatory animus.239 The 
dissent further provided that “[a] jury—not this court—should determine the 
meaning and credibility” of this proof.240 
V. CONCLUSION 
The statistics tell a hard tale: discrimination cases usually fail at sum-
mary judgment.241 Too often courts get lost in the shifting burdens and be-
lieve the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. Summary judg-
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ments require a degree of judicial discernment, but not so much as to over-
ride other reasonable inferences from the proof. This practical reality of dis-
crimination law violates the plain language of Federal Rule 56 and the 
summary judgment standard.242 
The Torgerson dissent is right.243 The Torgerson majority explained 
and excused evidence of discrimination, making credibility determinations 
and choosing which inferences to believe.244 There was direct evidence of 
discrimination in Torgerson. Two of the decision-makers made statements 
connecting unlawful discrimination to their hiring decisions.  The first 
Commissioner said he would have told the City not to take the SAFER grant 
if the Commissioner had known that it required a preference for minorities.  
The second Commissioner said he recommended a convicted felon because 
he was a “big guy.” The Fire Chief also called Torgerson and Mundell “un-
fit” while discussing the SAFER grant. It was undisputed that Torgerson and 
Mundell were qualified for the firefighter position. All three of these per-
sons, the two Commissioners and the Fire Chief, were involved in the hiring 
process, with two voting on the final list of hired candidates.245 
The evidence in Torgerson should also satisfy McDonnell Douglas.246 
Torgerson and Mundell were members of a protected class, were otherwise 
qualified for the open position, and were not hired while another non-
protected person of similar qualifications got the job. The City’s two legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reasons were the qualification test—with its two 
interview phases—and the results from the Fire Chief’s interviews. Howev-
er, it was undisputed that the Fire Chief interviewed Torgerson and Mundell 
using different criteria than those used in the other candidates’ interviews.247 
These separate criteria stemmed directly from Torgerson’s national origin 
and Mundell’s gender. Furthermore, the only reason Torgerson and Mundell 
were interviewed by the Fire Chief at all was the SAFER grant.248 So, the 
Chief looked for evidence that Torgerson and Mundell were equally or bet-
ter qualified than the other candidates. 
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This evidence, and the direct evidence of discrimination, created a gen-
uine dispute on pretext. Regardless of Torgerson’s and Mundell’s objective 
ranking before the two interviews, those interviews were subjective and 
ultimately determined who got the job. A jury should have decided these 
facts. Unfortunately, the cases are full of similar examples. Judges should 
not substitute their judgment for the jury’s in discrimination cases.249 The 
contrary reality nullifies the 1991 Amendments’ right to a jury trial. 
There is also no meaningful difference between mixed motive and sin-
gle motive. This issue plagues the circuits, contributing to the split on 
McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment.250 “It is increasingly hard to be-
lieve that in a multi-cultural society forty-five years after Title VII, numer-
ous employers base a business decision exclusively on whether an employee 
simply belongs to a protected class.”251 If a court examines a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason against evidence of pretext, that analysis necessarily 
implicates the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).252 Despite the 
qualification scores in Torgerson, there was also evidence that gender and 
national origin motivated the final phases of the hiring process.253 Thus, the 
employer’s reason can be legitimate but illegal if other motivations joined in 
the decision.254 
McDonnell Douglas remains the rule, and it persists in most circuits.  
The standard has practical applications: it hones the proof for trial, elicits the 
employer’s reason for the employment decision, and grants employees some 
latitude in proving their case.255 However, the circuits are split about in-
structing the jury on pretext, further complicating McDonnell Douglas’s 
role.256 Against the 1991 Amendments and Desert Palace, the continued 
utility of McDonnell Douglas is unclear. Pretext and mixed motive seem 
interrelated, with the two theories mixed together in some form in almost all 
of the circuits’ summary judgment standards.257 The plain language of 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) requires nothing less.258 Congress added an additional 
definition for an unlawful employment practice in § 2000e-2(m)—decisions 
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motivated in part by discrimination—not a separate standard of proof.259 The 
Eighth Circuit is poised to reconsider its position on the standard in an ap-
propriate case.   
Discrimination law is in disarray. The confusion about the 1991 
Amendments and Desert Palace needs resolution. Congress and the courts 
have struggled over the meaning and proof required by Title VII for dec-
ades.260 The Supreme Court tends to limit Title VII, while Congress favors 
its expansion. Until one of these institutions clarifies the summary judgment 
standard, McDonnell Douglas will remain the largest vehicle for disposing 
of discrimination cases nationwide. The tension between a merit-based deci-
sion and discrimination shall continue with obscurity, shifting its burden of 
uncertainty onto employers and employees alike.  
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